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Simplifying the Analysis: The Second Circuit Lays Out a
Straightforward Theory of Fraud in SEC v. Dorozhko*
INTRODUCTION

The conditions that led to the adoption of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19341 are eerily evocative of the
atmosphere currently plaguing the national economy.2 Since 2008 the
United States has suffered through a stock market crash, an economic
downturn, and a loss of investor confidence'-all market conditions
that starkly mirror the events originally driving the enactment of
section 10(b), a statute designed "to insure honest securities markets
and thereby promote investor confidence." 4 As the current economy
limps out of the "Great Recession,"' the need for fair and honest
securities markets will be of paramount importance.6 Consequently
the need will also be great for regulatory agencies, specifically the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),' to have a clear and
straightforward standard under which to pursue actors who engage in

* @2010 Sean F. Doyle.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). The Act was
necessary to restore investor confidence after the stock market crash of 1929. See SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658
(1997)). For an overview of the parallels between the current recession and the Great
Depression, see generally Miguel Almunia et al., From Great Depression to Great Credit
Crisis: Similarities, Differences and Lessons (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15524, 2009).
2. See Justin Lahart, The Great Recession: A Downturn Sized Up, WALL ST. J., July
28, 2009, at A12.
3. See David Leonhardt, Casualties of the Recession, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at Bl;
David Zweig, Will We Ever Again Trust Wall Street?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2010, at B7.
4. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658. The Court further expounded on the
purpose behind section 10(b), stating that "[a]lthough informational disparity is inevitable
in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a
market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by
law." Id.
5. Kurt Anderson, The End of Excess: Is This Crisis Goodfor America?, TIME (Mar.
26, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1887728-1,00.html.
6. See Zweig, supra note 3.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). The Securities and Exchange Commission was created
as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "with an arsenal of flexible enforcement
powers" for the "efficient regulation of securities trading." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
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fraudulent behavior in securities markets-particularly as technology
changes the very landscape of those markets.'
However, the principal antifraud statute, section 10(b), has
become anything but straightforward, enduring a tortured existence
as courts struggled to force different behaviors to fit into its mold.'
Most notably, section 10(b) has been used to combat insider
trading-traditionally defined as "[t]he use of material, nonpublic
information in trading the shares of a company by a corporate insider
or other person who owes a fiduciary duty."10 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit therefore struck a
progressive and potentially expansive victory for section 10(b)'s
fundamental antifraud purpose in SEC v. Dorozhko.1 The court held
that liability under section 10(b) could be found upon a showing of an
affirmative misrepresentation, regardless of whether a fiduciary duty
existed.12 The appellate court's decision directly overturned the lower
court's determination that section 10(b) could not be violated without
a breach of fiduciary duty." Indeed, the significance of the Second
Circuit's holding in Dorozhko is most aptly underscored by the
district court's declaration that "[t]o eliminate the fiduciary
requirement now would be to undo decades of Supreme Court
precedent, and rewrite the law as it has developed."14 Specifically, the
Second Circuit's decision was contrary to Regents of the University of
8. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION

§ 1.0[2],

at 3-

4 (rev. 5th ed. 2006).
9. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on
Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 881 (2009) ("The federal
securities laws do not contain a definition of insider trading. As a result, case law has
developed in a common law fashion from the broad statutory antifraud prohibitions. The
result has been a tortuous path in defining the reach of the prohibition against trading
securities on the basis of nonpublic information.").
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 866(9th ed. 2009).

11. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
12. Id. at 49-50.
13. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42
("Upon a searching review of existing case law ... we believe that we are constrained to
hold that [defendant's actions do] not amount to a violation of § 10(b) ... because
[defendant] did not breach any fiduciary or similar duty 'in connection with' the purchase
or sale of a security.").
14. Id. at 323. The district court also posited that
in the 74 years since Congress passed the Exchange Act, no federal court has ever
held that the theft of material non-public information by a corporate outsider and
subsequent trading on that information violates § 10(b). Uniformly, violations of
§ 10(b) have been predicated on a breach of a fiduciary (or similar) duty of candid
disclosure that is 'in connection with' the purchase or sale of securities.
Id.
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Inc.," an earlier

decision by the Fifth Circuit holding that "[a]n act cannot be
deceptive within the meaning of § 10(b) where the actor has no duty
to disclose."16 By eliminating the need to show the existence of a
fiduciary duty, the SEC is free to focus on all fraudulent behavior,
regardless of the actor's particular relationships, thereby simplifying
its burden and potentially broadening the scope of prohibited
behavior."
This Recent Development will argue that the Second Circuit was
correct in its holding that an affirmative misrepresentation is a
violation of section 10(b), regardless of whether a fiduciary duty is
present." To illustrate the point, the discussion of misrepresentation
will focus on a computer hacker who misrepresents his identity to a
computer to gain access to information. Part I will review SEC v.
Dorozhko, contrasting the decision and reasoning of the Second
Circuit with that of the district court it reversed. Part II will analyze
the scope of section 10(b), beginning with its common law roots and
overriding purpose and then exploring the Supreme Court's
development of insider trading liability under the statute. Part III will
explore the distinction between affirmative misrepresentations and
abrogations of a duty to disclose, arguing that the Second Circuit
15. 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
16. Id. at 386.
17. See Second Circuit Holds That Computer Hacking for Purposes of Trading on
Inside Information May Be a "Deceptive Device" Under Section 10(b) Even in the Absence
of a Breach of Any Fiduciary Duty, CORP. SEC. L. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2009),
http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/securities-litigation-second-circuit-holds-thatcomputer-hacking-for-purposes-of-trading-on-inside-information-may-be-a-deceptivedevice-under-section-10b-even-in-the-absence-of-a-breach-of-any-fiduciary-duty.html.
18. Pursuant to the rulemaking authority granted to it under section 10(b), the SEC
enacted Rule 10b-5 in 1942. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); see also
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (delineating the unlawful manifestations of affirmative
misrepresentation in securities transactions); infra Part II.B (discussing the purpose
behind the enactment of section 10(b)). Although Rule 10b-5 is the means under which
the SEC will most likely pursue insider trading cases involving an affirmative
misrepresentation, the focus of this Recent Development will be section 10(b), since the
scope of the Rule cannot exceed the power granted to the Commission under section
10(b). See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002) ("The scope of Rule 10b-5 is
coextensive with the coverage of § 10(b) ... ; therefore we use § 10(b) to refer to both the
statutory provision and the Rule.") (citations omitted); United States v. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 651 (1997) ("Liability under Rule 10b-5 ... does not extend beyond conduct
encompassed by § 10(b)'s prohibition."); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472
(1977) ("[I]n deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action for 'fraud' under Rule
10b-5, 'we turn first to the language of § 10(b).' " (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at
197)); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 ("[D]espite the broad view of the Rule advanced by
the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission
by Congress under § 10(b).").
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correctly distinguished between the two theories based on Supreme
Court precedent. It will then further examine the split between the
Second and Fifth Circuits, ultimately deciding that the Second Circuit
correctly defined "deceptive" as not requiring a fiduciary duty for all
violations." Part IV will further defend the straightforward theory of
fraud through an analysis of the relevant case law surrounding the
Second Circuit's
decision and by addressing potential
counterarguments. Finally, Part V will consider the future
ramifications of the Second Circuit's decision, concluding that the
court's new standard streamlines the section 10(b) analysis and
furthers the statute's remedial, antifraud purpose.
I. SEC v. DOROZHKO
In Dorozhko, the defendant (Oleksandr Dorozhko) opened an
online trading account with a brokerage firm and deposited $42,500
into the account,20 just as IMS Health, a healthcare market research
company,21 announced it would release quarterly company earnings at
a scheduled analyst conference call later in the month.22 On the day
IMS Health was to release its earnings, Dorozhko allegedly hacked
into the secure server hosting IMS Health's financial data and
downloaded the information. 23 Dorozhko then spent roughly the full
amount in his account on "put" options24 set to expire a week later.'
By purchasing the put options, Dorozhko would profit greatly if IMS
Health's stock price declined more than twenty percent within the
expiration period. 26 Later that same day IMS Health released its
third-quarter earnings, which fell twenty-eight percent short of Wall
Street's expectations. 27 IMS Health's stock dropped twenty-eight
percent shortly after the market opened the next day, whereupon
Dorozhko sold his put options, realizing a net profit of $286,456.59.28
19. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42,49-50 (2d Cir. 2009).
20. Id. at 44.
21. See Complaint at 4, SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No.
07 Civ. 9606).
22. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 44. The events at issue occurred in October 2007. Id.
23. Id.
24. As the court explained, "[a] 'put' option is 'faIn option that conveys to its holder
the right, but not the obligation, to sell a specific asset at a predetermined price until a
certain date.... Investors purchase puts in order to take advantage of a decline in the
price of the asset.'" Id. at 44 n.1 (second alteration in original) (quoting DAVID L. ScoTr,
WALL STREET WORDS 295 (3d ed. 2003)).
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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The SEC sought a preliminary injunction freezing the proceeds
from the put options of IMS Health stock under section 10(b), which
prohibits the use of any deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. 29 To gain the injunction, the
SEC had to make "a substantial showing of the likelihood of a
violation of § 10(b)."o Analyzing the language of the statute, the
district court isolated the term "deceptive" as the primary source of
contention," and undertook an exhaustive survey of insider trading
jurisprudence to determine if a violation of section 10(b) required a
breach of fiduciary duty.32 The court ultimately concluded that
deception as used in section 10(b) required the presence of-and
subsequent breach of-a fiduciary duty.33 Since the SEC could
produce no evidence that Dorozhko breached any fiduciary duty, the
district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.'
On appeal, the SEC maintained that Dorozhko's hacking was a
fraudulent affirmative misrepresentation.35 In contrast to the district
court, the court of appeals began its analysis with the premise that the
SEC's claim was separate from either of the two traditional insider
trading theories36 : the classical theory, wherein an " 'insider trades in
the securities of his own corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information,' "37 and the misappropriation theory, which finds
liability where " 'a person trades while in knowing possession of
material, non-public information that has been gained in violation of
a fiduciary duty to its source.' "38 Free from the two traditional

29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
30. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42.
31. Id. at 329 ("Thus, for the SEC to prevail, we must find that the alleged scheme was
'deceptive' as that term is used in the statute.").
32. Id. at 331-43.
33. Id. at 338. The district court summarized its findings by asserting that "the
Supreme Court has in a number of opinions carefully established that the essential
component of a § 10(b) violation is a breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain that
coincides with a securities transaction." Id.
34. Id. at 343.
35. Opening Brief of the SEC at 22-28, SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009)
(No. 08-0201-CV).
36. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 45 ("[W]e recognize that the SEC's claim against
defendant-a corporate outsider who owed no fiduciary duties to the source of the
information-is not based on either of the two generally accepted theories of insider
trading.").
37. Id. (quoting United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also
infra Part II.C (discussing the traditional insider trading theories).
38. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 45 (quoting United States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 87 (2d
Cir. 1997)); see also infra Part II.C (discussing the traditional insider trading theories).
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fiduciary-based theories,39 the Second Circuit held that Dorozhko
could be liable under this separate theory if his actions were
"deceptive" within the ordinary meaning of section 10(b).40 In
framing the issue this way, the court acknowledged that it chose a
different, more expansive definition of "deceptive" than did the Fifth
Circuit, thereby creating a circuit split over the scope of section
10(b). 41
II. FROM FRAUD TO SECURITIES FRAUD: THE SCOPE OF SECTION
10(B) AND RULE 1OB-5

A.

Common Law Adoption

The Second Circuit's holding that an actor need not be obligated
by a fiduciary duty for an affirmative misrepresentation to fall under
the "deceptive" language of section 10(b) finds support in common
law principles of fraud. 42 This support represents a crucial foundation,
as the Supreme Court has declared that section 10(b) is grounded in a
common law understanding of fraud.43 In his influential writing on
concealment and common law fraud, Professor W. Page Keeton lays
out the different types of possible fraud, separating out
misrepresentations based on words or acts from failures to disclose
39. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 331-36 (analyzing the precedent set by Supreme
Court cases defining the classical and misappropriation theories).
40. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 45.
41. Id. at 48.
42. Id. at 51.
43. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) ("At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon the false statement is
fraudulent."); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). Although grounded
in common law fraud, there is also indication that section 10(b) is meant to be more
encompassing. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 173 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur prior cases explained that to the
extent that 'the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with
common law doctrines of fraud,' it is because common law fraud doctrines might be too
restrictive." (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983)));
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961) ("Section 10(b) [is a] ... broad
remedial provision[ aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not
they are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for fraud and
deceit."). But see Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 162 (majority opinion) ("The argument that there
could be a reliance finding if this were a common law fraud action is answered by the fact
that § 10(b) does not incorporate common law fraud into federal law. ... " (citing SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002))). The Court, in announcing this proposition, relied on
a principle of refusing to extend section 10(b) to "every common law fraud that happens
to involve securities." SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820. As a central tenet of fraud, the
concept of affirmative misrepresentation does not fit this classification. See In re Parmalat
Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[T]he essence of fraud or deceit, at
least at common law, is a misrepresentation that induces detrimental reliance.").
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while under a duty of disclosure." In fact, at common law the primary
form of fraud was a misrepresentation made for the purpose of
inducing reliance.4 5 The extension of that principle led to the concept
of fraud encompassing failure to disclose information when one is
under a duty to do so."
An analysis of the Restatement of Torts adopted during the
period when section 10(b) was drafted is also particularly instructive.
The Restatement first posits a theory of liability for fraudulent
misrepresentations

where

"one

...

fraudulently

makes

a

misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law" on which
another relies.4 7 The Restatement goes on to define
"misrepresentation" as "not only words spoken or written but also
any other conduct which amounts to an assertion not in accordance
with the truth."48 This "affirmative misrepresentation" theory of fraud
is contrasted from a second, separate theory of liability derived from
nondisclosure.49 Under the "nondisclosure theory of fraud" a party is
liable when she fails to "exercise reasonable care to disclose to the
other ... such matters as the other is entitled to know because of a

fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between

44. W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1936) ("[I]t must be recognized that such conduct may consist of first, a
misrepresentation by a direct statement, i.e., by the use of words; second, a
misrepresentation resulting from the doing of certain acts; and finally, a misrepresentation
by silence resulting from the failure to disclose the existence of something which the other
person has reason to believe would be disclosed.").
45. GEORGE SPENCER BOWER, THE LAW OF ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION 28
(1911) (" '[M]isrepresentation' has no concern with cases of non-disclosure, as such, that
is, with cases of the mere violation of a duty, imposed by the policy of the law on parties
standing in certain relations to one another, to observe the utmost good faith by ...
disclosure of all known material facts.
); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the
Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2009) ("[T]he
common law generally imposed liability for affirmative misstatements. Fraud by silence
was actionable only in limited circumstances, and the default rule was one of caveat
emptor."); Ronald F. Kidd, Note, Insider Trading: The MisappropriationTheory Versus an
"Access to Information" Perspective, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 101, 107 (1993) ("Common law
fraud normally required an affirmative misrepresentation in order to be actionable.
Nondisclosure was grounds for fraud only in very limited circumstances.").
46. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227-28 ("At common law, misrepresentation made for
the purpose of inducing reliance upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails
to disclose material information prior to the consummation of the transaction commits
fraud only when he is under a duty to do so."); Keeton, supra note 44, at 1-2 (discussing
the inclusion of concealment as fraud when one is under a duty to disclose and the
inherent problems therein).
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525 (1938).
48. Id. § 525 cmt. b.
49. Id. § 551.
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them." 0 Further, under the nondisclosure theory of fraud the actor is
not liable for harm-even if she knows the other party is ignorant of
material information-unless she is under a fiduciary duty to
disclose."
Thus, at the time section 10(b) was adopted, common law
recognized two separate theories of liability for fraud: liability for
affirmative misrepresentations and liability for nondisclosure when
under a duty to disclose pertinent material information.
B.

The Purposeof Section 10(b)

Set against this back-drop of common law fraud, the Securities
Act of 193352 was promulgated to "provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of
securities in commerce, to protect investors againstfraud and . . . to

promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing."" The Act
itself was necessary to restore confidence after the stock market crash
of 1929.54
The Securities Exchange Act of 193411 furthered the twin goals of
fairness and efficiency in the securities markets through section 10(b),
which made it unlawful "for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."56 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also created the
Securities and Exchange Commission and provided it with a broad
range of powers to create and enforce new regulations." Rule 10b-5,11
50. Id.
51. Id. § 551 cmt. a.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
53. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (emphasis added) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933)).
54. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. 642,658 (1997)).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
56. Id. § 78j (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., id. §§ 78i, 78s, 78u; see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 ("As part of
the 1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is provided with an arsenal of
flexible enforcement powers.").
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). Under Rule 10b-5,
[ilt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... (a) [t]o employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material face necessary in order to make the
statements made ... not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
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promulgated in 194211 and adopted in 1948,1 has been the primary
means through which the SEC has battled insider trading.
Based on the language and the history of the statute, it is
apparent that the overarching goal is to eliminate fraud from the
securities market and promote fairness.62 Similarly, there is nothing in
the language to suggest that "deceptive" should be so narrowly
construed as to apply only to cases where the actor owes a fiduciary
duty, as the Fifth Circuit would interpret the term to require.6 3
Indeed, the broadness of the Senate Report associated with section
10(b) supports a more liberal interpretation, declaring that the section
was "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which have
been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function."' The Supreme
Court itself has recognized the need for the statute to be construed
expansively, stating that "Congress intended securities legislation
enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes,"6 and further recognizing that the statute was meant to
serve as a "catchall provision."'
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
59. HAZEN, supra note 8, § 12.3[2], at 475-76.
60. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices by Any Purchaser of a
Security, 13 Fed. Reg. 8,183 (Dec. 22,1948).
61. Veronica M. Dougherty, A [Dis]semblance of Privity: Criticizing the
Contemporaneous Trader Requirement in Insider Trading, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 85
(1999); see supra note 18. As one district court has helpfully explained, "[t]he law of
insider trading is not based on a federal statute expressly prohibiting the practice; it has
instead developed through SEC and judicial interpretations of § 10(b)'s prohibition of
'deceptive' conduct and Rule 10b-5's antifraud provisions." SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d
713, 720 (N.D. Tex 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
62. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (stating that securities
statutes maintain public confidence in the marketplace by deterring fraud); S. REP. No.
104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
63. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
389 (5th Cir. 2007).
64. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 6 (1934).
65. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (explaining that section 10(b) should be read "flexibly").
66. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980)). Speaking about what was
to become section 10(b), see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-03 (1976),
drafter Thomas G. Corcoran said, "Of course [section 10(b)] is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause.
The Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices." Stock
Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on
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A narrow reading of such an essential term of the statute as
"deceptive," therefore, would serve only to frustrate the intent
behind section 10(b). It would be contrary to the very essence of an
antifraud statute designed to be construed both flexibly67 and
adaptively,6 8 if an actor was able to affirmatively defraud the market
and then escape liability simply because he lacked the requisite
fiduciary duty. Numerous journal articles have explored the vexing
conundrum of the computer hacker as a "mere thief" who can escape
liability due to the absence of a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain.69
But an individual making an affirmative misrepresentation is
distinguishable from the mere thief by the obvious and overriding
presence of the misrepresentation as a fraud itself.70
Misrepresentation, after all, inherently contains an element of fraud
or deception, while theft can be achieved without trickery.71
Consequently, the language and intent of the legislation,
combined with the principles of common law fraud present during its
promulgation, encourage a reading that includes insider trading,
affirmative misrepresentations as falling under the scope of section
10(b), and not limiting construction to only frauds where a fiduciary
duty is present. A brief overview of Supreme Court insider trading
jurisprudence and the incorporated reliance on fiduciary duty,
however, serves to highlight the controversial nature of the Dorozhko
decision.

Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G.
Corcoran).
67. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).
68. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12 ("Since practices constantly vary and where practices
legitimate for some purposes may be turned to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad
discretionary powers in the regulatory agency have been found practically essential."
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 6 (1934))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. See, e.g., Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV.
181, 221-22 (2005-2006); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of
Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'HaganSuggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1253 (1998);
Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading
Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 297-98 (1999) ("[T]hieves unrelated to the source
of the information could steal the information without being in violation of existing
federal securities laws."); Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REv. 570, 589-95
(2008) (discussing theft under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
70. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
71. David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: Ginsburg's O'Hagan: Insider Trading
Ignored, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423,470 (exploring the definitions of "theft" and "deceit").
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Developing a Theory of Insider Trading Liability

The central premise driving securities regulation is parity of
access to information, and the "justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information."72 Socalled corporate insiders, meaning directors or management officers,
are privy to information not generally known to the investing public,
thereby creating a potentially problematic informational inequality."
Consequently, an insider in possession of material nonpublic
information has a duty to "either disclose it to the investing public, or,
if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in
or recommending the securities concerned while such information
remains undisclosed."" The foregoing proposition is commonly
referred to as the "disclose or abstain" rule75 and serves as the basis
for liability under the classical theory of insider trading. When the
classical theory first reached the Supreme Court in Chiarellav. United
States,76 the Court adopted and applied the principle by holding that a
financial printer who traded on material nonpublic information
obtained from his employer did not violate section 10(b) by failing to
disclose because he was under no fiduciary duty to disclose.77
The Court in Chiarella also entertained, but did not decide, the
possibility that the defendant could be liable under section 10(b) for
misappropriated information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to his
72. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc); see also
Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966) (explaining that
market forces cannot operate where investors have no confidence in directors of public
corporations or where corporate insiders seek to take advantage of inside information).
73. Tex. Gulf, 401 F.2d at 852 ("[I]nequities based upon unequal access to knowledge
should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of the congressional
concern in the area, remain uncorrected.").
74. Id. at 848; In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) ("[Tlhe courts
have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.").
75. See Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and Insiders' Incentive to
Misrepresent, 47 AM. Bus. L.J. 313, 319 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
77. Id. at 234-35. In Chiarella,an employee of a financial printer deduced confidential
information concerning takeover bids that belonged to his employer. Id. at 224. He then
traded on this information, realizing a profit of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of
fourteen months. Id. The Court held that (1) defendant could not be liable under section
10(b) because he was under no duty to disclose since he was not an agent or fiduciary to
the sellers, and (2) the section 10(b) duty to disclose does not arise from simply having
possession of material nonpublic information. Id. at 234-35.
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employer." Following a circuit split on this "misappropriation
theory,"" the issue again came before the Supreme Court-directly,
this time-in United States v. O'Hagan." James O'Hagan, a lawyer for
a firm that represented a client poised to make an acquisition through
tender offer, learned information from his employer and purchased
call options in the stock of the company to be acquired before the
tender offer was announced." The Supreme Court decided that the
misappropriation theory comported with section 10(b)'s "statutory
requirement that there be 'deceptive' conduct 'in connection with'
securities transactions"' and formally adopted the theory.8 3 Although
an evolution in the scope of liability for insider trading, the
misappropriation theory was "premised on the same 'disclose or
abstain' rationale as the traditional theory."'
Thus, both traditional theories of insider trading, classical and
misappropriation, are based on the presence of fiduciary duty."
Viewed in that light, the controversy of the Second Circuit's decision
in Dorozhko becomes clear. Yet as the Second Circuit correctly
78. Id. at 235-36. The Court did not decide the issue because it was not relevant on
appeal. Id. at 236 ("We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was not
submitted to the jury.").
79. Compare,e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (recognizing the Second Circuit's adoption of the misappropriation theory), with
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 952 (4th Cir. 1995) (refusing to adopt the
misappropriation theory).
80. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
81. Id. at 647-48.
82. Id. at 658-59.
83. Id. at 666 ("The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the misappropriation theory
is inconsistent with § 10(b).").
84. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2009).
85. See Liu Duan, Comment, The Ongoing Battle Against Insider Trading: A
Comparison of Chinese and U.S. Law and Comments on How China Should Improve Its
Insider Trading Law Enforcement Regime, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 129, 135 (2009) (describing
how the fiduciary-duty-based classical and misappropriation theories are "the current
basis for U.S. insider trading regulations"). It is also worth noting that the Court has
extended insider trading liability to reach non-insiders who owe no duty to the company,
but to whom a corporate insider has passed material nonpublic information improperly.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). Under this theory, when a company insider
(tipper) passes along material nonpublic information to an outsider (tippee) in violation of
a fiduciary duty, the tippee assumes a fiduciary duty not to trade on the information. Id. at
660 ("[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade
on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty
to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach."); see also Carolyn Silane, Electronic Data
Theft: A Legal Loophole for Illegally-Obtained Information-A Comparative Analysis of
U.S. and E.U Insider Trading Law, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 333, 343-44 (2009)
(giving an overview of tipper-tippee liability).
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notes, both of these theories rely on a nondisclosure theory of fraud.86
And as apparent from common law fraud principles, nondisclosure is
an entirely different species of fraud from the affirmative
misrepresentation theory which served as the basis for liability in
Dorozhko.87
III. A "DECEPTIVE" DISTINCrION: AFFIRMATIVE
MISREPRESENTATION VERSUS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE

A.

Dorozhko Correctly DistinguishedBetween Cases Involving
Affirmative Misrepresentationfrom Failure-to-DiscloseCases

The distinction between an affirmative misrepresentation theory
of fraud and a nondisclosure theory is especially important when
examining the Supreme Court's insider trading jurisprudence because
the entire relevant line of precedent represents an attempt by the
Court to force insider trading into the category of failure to disclosewhich, as discussed above, requires a fiduciary duty to be actionable."
For example, in Chiarella the Court struggled to apply liability in a
situation where there was no affirmative misrepresentation, but
rather the lawful possession and use of material information by an
employee.89 Faced with the absence of an affirmative
misrepresentation, the Court drew from the alternate theory of
fraud-an affirmative duty to disclose stemming from a fiduciary
relationship.90 The Court therefore held that because the petitioner
was under no duty to abstain or disclose, he could not be held liable
under section 10(b) for his silence.9 1 Both O'Hagan and SEC v.
Zandford" similarly lacked an affirmative misrepresentation, drawing

86. Dorothko, 574 F.3d at 48 ("In Chiarella, O'Hagan, and Zandford, the theory of
fraud was silence or nondisclosure, not an affirmative misrepresentation.").
87. Id. at 49 ("While Chiarella, O'Hagan, and Zandford all dealt with fraud qua
silence, an affirmative misrepresentation is a distinct species of fraud.").
88. See Silane, supra note 85, at 341-47 (tracking the development of both the
classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading liability).
89. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1980).
90. Id. at 226-30 (setting forth that the legal issue at hand was whether silence violates
section 10(b) and then adopting the Cady, Roberts rule that " 'insiders must disclose
material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons to whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment' " (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961))).
91. Id. at 234.
92. 535 U.S. 813 (2002). Zandford involved a securities broker convicted of wire fraud
for a scheme misappropriating his customer's funds. Id. at 815-16. The Court held that the
requisite elements were met, such that liability under section 10(b) was proper. Id. at 825;
see infra Part IV.B (discussing Zandford).
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instead on a liability theory derived from a failure to disclose in
breach of a fiduciary duty.93
Thus, although couched in disappointingly conclusory language,
the rationale driving the Second Circuit's holding in Dorozhko was
nonetheless correct.94 Common law has given rise to two distinct
methods of fraud: affirmative misrepresentations and silence while
under an affirmative duty to disclose.95 The major cases that shaped
the Supreme Court's insider trading law stemmed from the
nondisclosure prong, not the affirmative misrepresentation prong. 96
The Supreme Court has therefore established a fiduciary duty
requirement only for failure-to-disclose cases, not for affirmative
misrepresentations. The Second Circuit was thus correct in its
summation of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 10(b) as
not requiring a fiduciary duty as an element for all fraudulent
violations.'
B.

The Origin of the Rift: The Scope of Deception
The Fifth Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion than
the Second Circuit regarding the scope of section 10(b) in Credit
Suisse First Boston. The split between the Second and Fifth Circuits
arises from the proper way to define deception; specifically, whether
the "deceptive" element of section 10(b) requires the presence-and
subsequent breach-of a fiduciary duty.98 In Dorozhko, the Second
Circuit looked to the ordinary meaning of the term (as set forth in
Webster's New International Dictionary), finding that "[i]n

its

ordinary meaning, 'deceptive' covers a wide spectrum of conduct
involving cheating or trading in falsehoods." 99 The court found
93. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820-21; United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654-55
(1997).
94. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42,49 (2d Cir. 2009).
95. See supra Part II.A.
96. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48 ("In our view, none of the Supreme Court opinions
relied upon by the District Court-much less the sum of the three opinions-establishes a
fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every violation of Section 10(b). In Chiarella,
O'Hagan, and Zandford, the theory of fraud was silence or nondisclosure, not an
affirmative misrepresentation."). Of course, both the Second Circuit in Dorozhko and the
Fifth Circuit in Credit Suisse First Boston relied on O'Hagan and Chiarella in reaching
their contrary conclusions regarding the role of fiduciary duty in the definition of
deceptive. See Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48-50; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse
First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389 n.30 (5th Cir. 2007).
97. See Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48.
98. See id. ("At least one of our sister circuits has made the same observation relying
on the same precedent.").
99. Id. at 50. For the specific definition used by the court, see WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

679 (2d ed. 1934)
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dispositive an argument made in the SEC's brief that " '[d]eception,'
based on the ordinary meaning of the term, includes any declaration,
artifice or practice having the power to mislead, to cause to believe
the false, or to disbelieve the true, as by falsification, concealment, or
cheating; an attempt to lead into error; a trick or a fraud.""oo Indeed,
according to the court, "[i]n its ordinary meaning, 'deceptive' covers a
wide spectrum of conduct involving cheating or trading in
falsehoods."10' Based on this definition, the court held that the
defendant could be liable for a violation of section 10(b) if he
fraudulently obtained the material information used in the trade,
even absent a fiduciary duty to the source.102
The Fifth Circuit took a different view in Credit Suisse First
Boston, holding that the term "deceptive" in section 10(b) required a
duty to disclose.10 The court, in deciding whether to certify a class,
reasoned that it was inappropriate to subscribe a common meaning to
statutory text where the Supreme Court has "pointedly refused to
define 'deceptive' in any way except through case law."10 To do so,
the court cautioned, is to "improperly ... substitute the authority of

[hereinafter WEBSTER'S DIcTIONARY]. The court relied on Webster's Dictionarybased on
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.20 (1976), where the Court looked to that
dictionary to define other key terms in section 10(b). The Supreme Court has looked to
dictionaries contemporaneous with the promulgation of a statute to determine the
ordinary meaning of terms in several other notable cases. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute
Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874 (1999); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7
(1993).
100. See Opening Brief of the SEC, supra note 35, at 13.
101. Dorozohko, 574 F.3d at 50 (citing WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at
679).
102. Id. at 51.
103. 482 F.3d 372, 386 (5th Cir. 2007). The allegation in Credit Suisse First Boston was
that the defendant banks formed partnerships and entered into transactions that allowed
Enron Corporation to temporarily take liabilities off of its books and to falsely book
revenue from transactions when it was actually incurring debt. Id. at 377. Essentially, these
transactions allowed Enron to misstate its financial condition. Id. In order to determine
whether the plaintiff class could be certified, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether
the district court's broad definition of "deceptive" (which included the banks' acts, even
though no fiduciary duty was owed to the individual plaintiffs) was correct. Id. at 381-82.
104. Id. at 389. The court began with the premise that
[d]ecisions interpreting the statutory text place a limit on the possible definitions
that can be ascribed to the words contained in the SEC's rule promulgated
thereunder. It is by losing sight of the limits that the statute places on the rule, and
by ascribing, natural, dictionary definitions to the words of the rule, that the
district court and like-minded courts have gone awry.
Id. at 387 (footnote omitted). Coincidently, the court cited to the exact same footnote in
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 n.20, when making this point as the court in Dorozhko did
when supporting a completely contrary point. See supra note 99.
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the dictionary for that of the Supreme Court.""os The court surveyed
relevant Supreme Court precedent-Chiarellaand O'Hagan-and

determined that there could be no violation of section 10(b) under
the "deceptive" rubric absent a breach of a fiduciary duty to
disclose.106 The court further declared that it was improper to look to
the common law meaning of "deceptive," since the Supreme Court
had authoritatively passed on the language of the statute, thereby
making the common law meaning of the language irrelevant.'07
The source of contention between the circuits is thus whether the
term "deceptive" as defined in the Supreme Court's leading insider
trading cases requires a fiduciary duty, or if a deceptive affirmative
misrepresentation, absent a fiduciary duty, is also sufficient for a
violation.
C.

Defining Deception

The Fifth Circuit arrived at its conclusion that deception must
involve a breach of fiduciary duty by reasoning that, since the
Supreme Court had interpreted the statute through case law, it
consequently limited the possible definitions that could be attributed
to specific words within section 10(b).o" Therefore, the court
reasoned, defining deception via the dictionary would be an improper
substitution of authority. 09 The fallacy underlying the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion, however, is the premise that the Supreme Court has
authoritatively ruled that the term "deceptive" in section 10(b)
always requires a breach of fiduciary duty.110
The Fifth Circuit cited to Chiarellaand O'Hagan to support its
proposition that the Court has established a fiduciary duty
requirement for all deceptive acts under section 10(b)."' Yet, as
discussed above, Chiarella and O'Hagan stand only for the
proposition that a fiduciary duty is required when the theory of
liability is nondisclosure." 2 When the theory of liability arises from an
105. Credit Suisse First Bos., 482 F.3d at 389.
106. Id.
107. Id. ("[P]laintiffs' reference to the common law meaning of 'deceptive' is fruitless;
where the Supreme Court has authoritatively construed the pertinent language of the
statute .. ., the common law meaning of that language is irrelevant.").
108. Id.
109. Id. ("[D]efining 'deceptive' by referring to the same dictionary the Court used to
define [another term in the statute] is improperly to substitute the authority of the
dictionary for that of the Supreme Court.").
110. See id. at 389 n.30.
111. Id.
112. See supra Part III.A.
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affirmative misrepresentation-as it did in Dorozhko-the Supreme
Court has not foreclosed the possibility that liability may exist absent
a fiduciary duty."3 Consequently, since the Supreme Court has not
authoritatively limited the meaning that can be ascribed to the term
"deceptive" for all violations of section 10(b), using the dictionary to
define the term as the Second Circuit did is not an impermissible
substitution of authority.
The Second Circuit, therefore, did not engage in a great leap of
inductive reasoning when it used the same dictionary the Supreme
Court used in defining other relevant terms in section 10(b) to define
"deceptive."114 Yet the Fifth Circuit in Credit Suisse First Boston
argued that the Supreme Court "has pointedly refused to define
'deceptive' in any way except through caselaw."1' Perhaps a more
reasonable interpretation is that the Supreme Court has not been
presented with a situation necessitating an explicit definition of the
term. 116 For example, at issue in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder"' was
intent; the Court looked to the relevant terms that would further an
understanding of a scienter requirement, to which a definition of
"deceptive" would have been of no further clarifying assistance."'
Omission of a definition for "deceptive" was thus not "pointed,"

113. See supra Part III.A.
114. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In its ordinary meaning,
'deceptive' covers a wide spectrum of conduct involving cheating or trading in
falsehoods." (citing WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY, supra note 99, at 679)).
115. 482 F.3d at 389.
116. The Supreme Court has used Webster's Dictionary to define terms in a similar
securities context only twice; both occurrences related to a determination of the necessity
of "scienter." See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980) (using the dictionary to
define key terms in section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 to determine if Congress
intended a scienter requirement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.21
(1976) (using the dictionary to define key terms in section 10(b) to determine if Congress
intended a scienter requirement). It therefore appears that there are too few examples of
the Court using a dictionary-in a similar context-to define securities-related statutory
terms to support the Fifth Circuit's assertion that the Court has "pointedly refused" to
define deception other than through case law. See CreditSuisse First Bos., 482 F.3d at 389.
117. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Ernst & Ernst, the president and principal shareholder of a
brokerage firm perpetrated a scheme to defraud customers of the firm. Id. at 189.
Customers of the brokerage firm brought suit against the accounting firm, Ernst & Ernst,
alleging that Ernst & Ernst aided and abetted the fraud by failing to conduct a proper
audit. Id.
118. Id. at 198-99. The Court looked to the dictionary to define the terms
"manipulative" and "device" to determine whether section 10(b) embraced negligent
conduct. Id. at 199 nn.20-21. Since the definition of "device" included a deception
requirement, and by corollary an intent requirement, to separately define "deceptive"
would be supererogatory. Id. at 199 n.20 (quoting WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note
99, at 713 (defining "device" in part as "a scheme to deceive")).
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meaning deliberate, as the Fifth Circuit asserted,"' but rather simply
not useful.
In fact, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the primary
means of interpreting section 10(b) is through the language of the
statute itself.120 Ernst & Ernst is particularly representative of the
Court's approach in this regard.121 Confronted with the issue of
whether section 10(b) required a showing of scienter, the Court began
its analysis by performing a thorough examination of the language of
the statute.122 During its analysis the Court derived meaning from the
dictionary's definition of "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance"
to determine that a showing of intent was necessary.123 The Court
thereby signified that it is the common meaning of the words in the
statute that should provide guidance in determining its scope. 24
The Supreme Court further reinforced the importance of
following the common meaning of the language of section 10(b) in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.25 In defining the boundaries of
119. Credit Suisse FirstBos., 482 F.3d at 389.
120. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F.
Supp. 2d 472, 501 & n.150 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court begins
any analysis of section 10(b) with the statute's text).
121. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (relying on the manner
in which the Court in Ernst & Ernst approached a section 10(b) statutory construction
issue, beginning with the principle that intent must be derived from the language of the
statute). In rejecting the SEC's argument that nothing in section 10(b) requires a
"knowing or intentional practice[]," the Court stated, "the [SEC] would add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning."
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 198-99.
122. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 198-99.
123. Id. at 199 nn.20-21. The Court refuted the argument that section 10(b) barred
negligent conduct by looking to the common meaning of the words "manipulative,"
"device," and "contrivance" in the statute. Id. at 199. Finding the ordinary meaning of
each of the terms indicative of intentional behavior, the Court declared that to accept the
proposition that section 10(b) did not contain a scienter requirement for private action
suits would be a deviation from the common meaning of those terms. Id.
124. Id. at 197. To determine the scope of section 10(b), the Court "turn[ed] first to the
language of § 10(b) for 'the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute
is the language itself.' " Id. (quoting Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756). The Court also
noted that " 'legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common
run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense of the thing, as the
ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him.' " Id. at 199 n.19
(quoting Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944)).
125. 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977). In Santa Fe Industries, minority stockholders brought
suit against the majority shareholders, alleging a violation of section 10(b) because their
shares had been fraudulently appraised in an attempt to freeze them out. Id at 467. The
issue before the Court was whether there could be a violation of section 10(b) by a
fiduciary absent a misrepresentation or failure to disclose. Id. at 470. The Court held that
there could not. Id. at 476.
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fraud, however, the issue before the Court was what constituted fraud
when a fiduciary duty was present. 26 The Court rejected the
petitioner's attempt to broaden the scope of fraud, finding that in all
of the Court's prior cases there was some element of deception, and a
cause of action under Rule 10b-5 was appropriate "only if the conduct
alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the
meaning of the statute."1 27 The Court, therefore, underscored the
necessity that the act be deceptive in the ordinary meaning of the
wordl 28 by clarifying that the presence of a fiduciary duty alone could
not constitute grounds for section 10(b) liability. 129 As the Second
Circuit has made clear, an affirmative misrepresentation, and
specifically "misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain
unauthorized access to information ...

,

and then stealing that

information is plainly 'deceptive' within the ordinary meaning of the
word."'
Further, Credit Suisse First Boston can also be distinguished

based on the context in which the case arose. The issue facing the
Fifth Circuit was certification in a securities class action suit.13' Read
narrowly, the court's holding that the "deceptive" language of section
10(b) requires a breach of a duty to disclose can be viewed only in
light of establishing reliance in a private suit.13 2 It is plausible that had
the Fifth Circuit been presented with the facts of Dorozhko, they
might have ruled largely in the same manner as the Second Circuit.133
126. Id. at 473-74. The minority shareholders argued that majority shareholders
violated Rule 10b-5 by obtaining a fraudulent appraisal of the stock and then offering an
amount greater than the appraised price " 'in order to lull the minority shareholders into
erroneously believing that [Santa Fe was] generous.' " Id. at 467 (alteration in original)
(quoting Appendix at 103a, Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462 (No. 75-1753)).
127. Id. at 473-74.
128. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214, for the commonly understood definition
of specific terms in section 10(b) for guidance on the scope of the statute).
129. Id.
130. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
131. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
379 (5th Cir. 2007).
132. See id. at 382-84. A broad interpretation of "deceptive acts" was necessary for a
classwide presumption of reliance under a "fraud-on-the-market theory." Id. at 382. For a
"fraud-on-the-market theory"-adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988)-to be applicable, the Fifth Circuit determined that there must be a
duty flowing from the defendants such that the market had a right to rely on the
defendant's actions. Credit Suisse FirstBos., 482 F.3d at 383.
133. Since reliance is not a requirement in an SEC suit, it is possible that the Fifth
Circuit would have ruled largely the same as the Second Circuit if presented the Dorozhko
case. See SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Blavin,
760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); SEC v. N. Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424
F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970). The problem with this argument is that the two Supreme Court
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Even if so distinguished, however, carving out disparate definitions of
the term "deceptive" dependent upon the context in which the act
arises would serve only to further muddle an already perplexing
insider trading jurisprudence.
IV. DEFENDING THE "STRAIGHTFORWARD" THEORY OF FRAUD

A.

The Second Circuit Could Have Relied on Additional Case Law

Having correctly determined both that an affirmative
misrepresentation was actionable under common law fraudl3 4 and that
Supreme Court insider trading precedent arose from the distinct
nondisclosure theory of fraud,'35 the Second Circuit could have gone
even further in supporting the theory that an affirmative
misrepresentation violates section 10(b) by relying on additional case
law. The court cited only to Basic, Inc. v. Levinson 36 as support for an
affirmative misrepresentation theory of liability.'37 The problem,
however, is that Basic may not be the best foundation to solely
ground an affirmative misrepresentation without further elaboration,
as it dealt with the difference between abrogation of a duty to disclose
and affirmative representations by corporate insiders.'38 This opens
up the counterargument that insiders are always under an obligation
not to mislead.3 9
cases the Fifth Circuit relied on in asserting that "deceptive" contained a fiduciary
requirement, Chiarellaand O'Hagan,were not private civil litigations. See United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997) (noting that the government initiated the prosecution
of the defendant); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1979) (same).
Accordingly, whether the case was brought by the SEC or by a private litigant should not
be dispositive under the Fifth Circuit's reasoning.
134. See supraPart II.A.
135. See supraParts II.C, III.A.
136. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
137. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit cited to
footnote 18 in Basic for the proposition that a person is under an affirmative obligation
not to mislead in business dealings. Id.
138. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n.18.
139. See id. (distinguishing between insiders trading without disclosing from affirmative
misrepresentations made by those under a duty not to mislead); Donald C. Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1982) (explaining the duties insiders are under); Robert A. Prentice, Scheme
Liability: Does It Have a Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 351,406 ("[T]here is
a strong common law and section 10(b) obligation not to defraud others, even if they are
strangers."). Any counterargument attempting to distinguish cases finding section 10(b)
liability absent a fiduciary duty based on the presence of a corporate insider because they
are under an "ever-present duty not to mislead" appears to be misguided. Basic, 485 U.S.
at 240 n.18; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 661 (1997) ("The Court did
not hold in [Chiarella v. United States] that the only relationship promoting liability for
trading on undisclosed information is the relationship between a corporation's insiders
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An additional basis on which the Second Circuit could have
grounded its reasoning is footnote 7 from Superintendent of Insurance
v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co.1" There, the Court cited to language
from an earlier Second Circuit decision stating that section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 " 'prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve
a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of
deception.' "141 The Court explicitly recognized that section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 provide liability for the equivalent of common law fraud,
and therefore, by corollary, both an affirmative misrepresentation
and an abrogation of a duty to'disclose are actionable thereunder. 142
Bankers Life itself is an example of a case where the Court
applied section 10(b) to a case involving simple fraud.1' However,
even though the decision was grounded in common law fraud, the
Court still recognized the presence of a fiduciary duty." In a private
civil litigation context, other cases have explicitly held that liability
for an affirmative misrepresentation requires no fiduciary duty.'45 In
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp.,146 the Third Circuit held that the
and shareholders."). As previously discussed, the difficulty in the insider trading
jurisprudence has been attaching liability in the absence of an affirmative
misrepresentation. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980). Once there
is no fiduciary duty, it is the presence of the fraud itself-the affirmative
misrepresentation-that is dispositive. Id.
140. 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971).
141. Id. (quoting A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967)).
142. See Steinbuch, supra note 69, at 573-74. For a discussion of fraud at common law,
see supra Part II.A.
143. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10. In Bankers Life, an insurance company's United
States Treasury Bonds (an amount of almost $5,000,000) were sold through a fraud
perpetrated by outside collaborators, a corporate officer, and a controlling shareholder.
Id. at 7-8. As a result, the company lost those assets. Id. at 8-9. The Court held that
section 10(b) provided available protection to the company. Id. at 13-14.
144. Id. at 12 ("The controlling stockholder owes the corporation a fiduciary
obligation-one 'designed for the protection of the entire community of interests in the
corporation-creditors as well as stockholders.' " (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
307 (1939))).
145. See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506-07 (3d Cir. 1988);
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967); Fry v. UAL Corp., 895 F.
Supp. 1018, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (recognizing option trader standing in affirmative
misrepresentation context), aff'd, 84 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 1996); Liebhard v. Square D Co.,
811 F. Supp. 354, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D.
150, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (same); W. Alton Jones Found. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (In re
Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig.), 725 F. Supp. 712, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(recognizing option trading standing in an affirmative misrepresentation action). But see,
e.g., Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412-14 (8th Cir. 1983) (denying
standing to plaintiff option trader under section 10(b) based on a lack of fiduciary duty);
Starkman v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 297, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same).
146. 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988).
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defendants could be liable under section 10(b) despite the absence of
a fiduciary duty. 14 7 The court explicitly stated that "[n]othing in
[Chiarella v. United States or Dirks v. SEC] can be construed to

require the existence of a fiduciary relation between a section 10(b)
defendant and the victim of that defendant's affirmative
misrepresentation."1 48 Further, there have been several recent cases
wherein the courts, applying a misappropriation theory of liability,
have moved away from a basis in fiduciary relationships toward a
more conduct-based approach.14 9
The breadth of case law, therefore, supports the Second Circuit's
holding that an affirmative misrepresentation violates section 10(b)
regardless of whether there is a breach of an underlying fiduciary
duty. As long as the affirmative misrepresentation meets the ordinary
meaning of "deceptive," the perpetrator of the act is liable for
violating section 10(b) under a straightforward theory of fraud.so
However, this conclusion has garnered its fair share of criticism, and
several counterarguments to the Second Circuit's theory of fraud
have been raised.
B.

Addressing Counterarguments:Why the Second Circuit's
Approach is Preferable

While an affirmative misrepresentation can violate section 10(b)
if it is deceptive, even absent a fiduciary duty, there remains the
147. Id. at 508. The district court in this case relied on Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980), and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), in finding that the defendants
could not be liable absent a special relationship of trust or confidence. Deutschman v.
Beneficial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 358, 361-64 (D. Del. 1987), rev'd, 841 F.2d 502. The Third
Circuit distinguished the case by explaining that "those cases dealt not with injury caused
by affirmative misrepresentation ... but with the analytically distinct problem of trading
on undisclosed information." Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506.
148. Deutschman, 841 F.2d at 506.
149. See SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that a wife
violated section 10(b) by obtaining material nonpublic information from her husband and
passing it along to her brother, despite the fact that she disclosed to her husband that she
intended to share the information); SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725-26 (N.D. Tex
2009) (holding that a breach of a contractual agreement can serve as the basis for section
10(b) liability), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally, the Supreme Court has
indicated support for a conduct-based approach in a decision concerning section 10(b) in
private action suits. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 158 (2008) (rejecting the notion that section 10(b) liability must be predicated on
misstatements, silence when under a duty to disclose, or manipulative practices and
declaring that conduct can be deceptive). For a thorough and insightful discussion on the
possibility of a deceptive acquisition theory of liability, see Nagy, supra note 45, at 136970.
150. See Hazen, supra note 9, at 901; Caselaw Developments 2009-Overview, 65 BUS.
LAW. 923, 924 (2010).
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argument that computer hacking, like other forms of theft, does not
constitute a deceptive affirmative misrepresentation."' The precise
question becomes, why is computer hacking actionable under section
10(b) while "mere theft" arguably is not? 5 2 The answer to this
question lies in the very nature of the hacking at issue, and the degree
to which it comports with both the ordinary meaning of deception
and the principles of common law affirmative misrepresentation.'5 3
The ordinary meaning of deception 5 4 and the Restatement
definition of misrepresentation" are both in accord that an
affirmative misrepresentation requires the assertion of a falsehood.
Consequently, the means by which the hack is accomplished becomes
dispositive. As Professor Orin Kerr explains in his article on
cybercrime, there are two methods of gaining unauthorized access to
a computer with user privileges regulated by code (i.e., passwordprotected): "engag[ing] in false identification and masquerad[ing] as
another user" and "exploit[ing] a weakness in the code within a
program to cause the program to malfunction in a way that grants the
user greater privileges."156
If a hacker "engage[s] in false identification and masquerade[s]
as another user,"' 57 she would appear to be fulfilling the requirement
of a false assertion under both the ordinary meaning of deception and
the common law requirements for an affirmative misrepresentation

151. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellee at 21-22, SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-0201-CV) (arguing that computer hacking is not actionable under
section 10(b)).
152. See supranote 69 and accompanying text.
153. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 50 ("[T]he District Court did not decide whether the
ordinary meaning of 'deceptive' covers the computer hacking in this case--or, indeed,
whether the computer hacking in this case involved any misrepresentation at all.").
154. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at 679 (defining deceive as "[tJo cause to
believe the false" and "[t]o impose upon; to deal treacherously with; cheat"); see supra
text accompanying notes 99-102.
155. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b (1938) (defining misrepresentation as
"conduct which amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the truth").
156. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1644-45 (2003) ("Circumventing
regulation by code generally requires a user to engage in one of two types of computer
misuse. First, the user may engage in false identification and masquerade as another user
who has greater privileges. For example, the user can use another person's password, and
trick the computer to grant the user greater privileges that are supposed to be reserved for
the true account holder.... Alternatively, a user can exploit a weakness in the code within
a program to cause the program to malfunction in a way that grants the user greater
privileges."); see also BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES 135-41 (2000) (discussing

computer access and prevalent methods of unauthorized access).
157. Kerr, supra note 156, at 1644.
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theory of fraud.' 8 To gain access, the hacker must falsely portray
herself as someone else-either one with initial privilege to access or
one with greater privileges than the hacker actually has. Professor
Kerr recognizes the prospect of this false assertion as fraud, noting
that false identification "resemble[s] fraud . . . because the computer

does not recognize that it is consenting to access by that particular
user."' 59 He explains that this flows from the fact that "the computer
is tricked into letting the user access the computer through a
misrepresentation .... The computer may 'believe' that the user is

someone else, as in the case of a defendant utilizing another person's
username and password."" The hacker is literally tricking the
computer, and in reliance on the hacker's false assertions the
computer grants access, thereby coming under the purview of
fraudulent affirmative misrepresentation.'1'
The Second Circuit distinguished the two different methods of
gaining access-false identification and exploitation of a weakness in
the code-by opining that false identification would clearly be a
violation of section 10(b), whereas exploiting a code weakness would
be more suitably categorized as mere theft, and therefore not
actionable. 62 The presence of the false assertion, or trickery, is the
crucial distinction between hacking that violates section 10(b) and
mere theft; mere theft is not actionable because of the absence of
fraud, or deception in the ordinary sense of the word.163 Therefore,
158. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
159. Kerr, supranote 156, at 1655.

§ 525 cmt. b (1938); supra Part III.B.

160. Id.
161. It may seem peculiar to use terms such as "believe" and "trick" when referring to
an inanimate object such as a computer. Yet as the SEC pointed out in its brief, computers
are largely being used to perform work historically carried out by humans, "such as
granting and denying access to confidential information." Opening Brief of the SEC, supra
note 35, at 24. Since "[tihe ultimate target of the deception is the company that owns the
information," it is therefore "of no legal consequence" that the "deception is
communicated through a computer system." Id. The U.S. Air Force Court of Military
Review in United States v. Flowerday, 28 MJ. 705 (A.C.M.R. 1989), further clarified the
issue by articulating an agency theory, declaring that it is the underlying legal entity
"which is being deceived and which, in reliance on that deceit, is providing the service that
forms the basis of the offense." Id. at 708; see also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 468, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding a computer network to be an agent of the
deceived party); Opening Brief of the SEC, supra note 35, at 24 n.9 ("Some courts have
analyzed this issue in terms of the computer being the agent of the deceived party." (citing
Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474)).
162. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
163. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation:A General Theory of Liability for
Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 122 (1984) ("When one
simply steals information from a stranger, his trading on the information does not involve
deception or fraud, and therefore should not be held to violate Rule 10b-5.").
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the determination of whether computer hacking is actionable under
section 10(b) will require an investigation by the court into whether
the purported hacker utilized fraudulent means to gain access to the
material nonpublic information." The presence of deception should
serve as the line of demarcation dividing actionable computer hacking
from mere theft and-if properly analyzed-should prevent any
undue expansion of insider trading liability into otherwise
inactionable behavior.
Similarly, the existing framework under SEC v. Zandford will
serve as a safeguard to guarantee that the hacking at issue satisfies the
requisite degree of "connection with" the purchase and sale of a
security,'' thereby ensuring that insider trading liability is not unduly
triggered for perpetrated frauds greatly attenuated from any
securities transactions.'" As the district court in Dorozhko concluded,
"[t]he relevant test to determine whether a device is used in
connection with securities transactions is whether the device and the
transactions 'coincide.' "167 Indeed, it is the "in connection with"
requirement that prevents section 10(b) from acting as "a broad
federal remedy for all fraud.""e
Under the Zandford framework, the hack must coincide with the
purchase or sale of securities, meaning it must be part of a single
scheme. 169 In Zandford, the defendant, a securities broker, sold his
customers' securities and then used the proceeds for his own

164. See Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51 (remanding for a determination "whether the
computer hacking ... involved a fraudulent misrepresentation that was 'deceptive' within
the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b)"); Randall W. Quinn, The MisappropriationTheory
of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of
United States v. O'Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 894-95 (2003) (discussing
the competing perspectives of whether hacking is more analogous to deceptive
impersonation or theft).
165. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) ("Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act makes it 'unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security ... , any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.")
(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006)).
166. See Nagy, supra note 69, at 1255 (discussing the difficulty in meeting the "in
connection with" requirement for affirmative deceptions based on computer hacking).
167. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Zandford,
535 U.S. at 822), vacated, 574 F.3d 42.
168. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (citing Great W. Bank & Trust
v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976); Bellah v. First Nat'1 Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114
(5th Cir. 1974)); see also SEC v. Zandford, 238 F.3d 559, 566 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e decline
to stretch the language of the securities fraud provisions to encompass every conversion or
theft that happens to involve securities."), rev'd, 535 U.S. 813.
169. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824-25.
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benefit."o The Supreme Court found the "in connection with"
requirement met because the defendant intended from the beginning
of the scheme to keep the proceeds from the sales, the scheme being
complete when the sale of securities took place."' A computer hack
will be actionable, therefore, if it is part of a single scheme that
becomes complete upon the purchase or sale of securities.17 2 In
analyzing Dorozhko, the district court found persuasive the proximity
in time between the hack and securities transactions (thirty-five
minutes), and the relative lack of value of the information "apart
from its use in a securities transaction" in finding the "in connection
with" requirement met. 73 Ensuring that the hack and the securities
transaction "coincide" by analyzing the proximity of the two events,
the nature of the scheme, and the relative intrinsic value of the
information will serve to prevent section 10(b) from expanding
beyond its role as a federal remedy for fraud "in connection with"
securities transactions.
Yet even with the above confining safeguards, the Dorozhko
decision has already drawn criticism from scholars arguing that it
stretches the current insider trading rubric too far to encompass
activity that traditionally was not considered actionable under section
10(b). 74 Others have worried that the court's straightforward theory
of fraud represents a "slippery slope" that could potentially lead to
the inclusion of all thefts under section 10(b).1'7 The concern driving
these counterarguments is that an overly broad section 10(b) will lead
to uncertainty in the marketplace 6 and will be used as an amorphous
general liability statute to govern thefts only tangentially related to
corporate securities trading.177

170. Id. at 815.
171. Id. at 824-25.
172. See Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 328-29.
173. Id. at 329.
174. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Second Circuit's Egregious Decision in SEC
AM),
(July 29,
2009, 4:36
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
v. Dorozhko,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/07/the-second-circuitsrecent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-with-one-of-the-questions-leftopen-by-the.html ("So much for treading cautiously. After Dorozhko, 10b-5 will take over
the corporate universe.").
175. See, e.g., Amy Greer, Guest Column: "Straightforward Theory of Fraud" Leads
Second Circuit onto Slippery Slope, SEC. DOCKET, (July 30, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2009/07/30/guest-column-straightforward-theory-offraud-leads-second-circuit-onto-slippery-slope/.
176. See Bainbridge,supranote 174; Greer, supra note 175.
177. Bainbridge, supra note 174.
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These arguments, however, overlook the safeguards already in
place to prevent over-inclusiveness in section 10(b) jurisprudence: the
"in connection with" and "deceptive" requirements. Further, these
arguments miss the simplistic strength of the Second Circuit's
standard. In bypassing the lattice of legal theory that was necessary to
support the commonly accepted methods of insider trading theory,
courts are now able to focus on the essential core of the issue: the
presence of actual deception. Nor is there a realistic danger of all
thefts becoming actionable under section 10(b); the Second Circuit
made clear that the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant's
actions constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation within the common
meaning of deception."' Consequently-even if it does meet the "in
connection with" requirement-a simple theft absent any behavior
qualifying as fraudulent or deceptive will not be subject to section
10(b) liability. 17 9
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Through
its
decision
that
fraudulent
affirmative
misrepresentations represent a valid cause of action under section
10(b), the Second Circuit has given the SEC a powerful weapon with
which to pursue violators.so The standard for liability is now simply
the ordinary meaning of "deceptive," which, as the court proclaimed,
''covers a wide spectrum of conduct involving cheating or trading in
falsehoods." 81 The inherent broadness of this standard is facially
apparent. As discussed above, the Second Circuit differentiated
between the two primary standards of computer hackingmisrepresenting one's identity to gain access to information versus
exploiting a weakness in the programming code to gain access-and
found that misrepresentation of one's identity would be deceptive
under section 10(b).18
Under this precedent, the relevant inquiry in determining if a
violation of section 10(b) has occurred will be whether the case
involves "a fraudulent misrepresentation that [is] 'deceptive' within

178. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 50 (citing WEBSTER'S DIcrIONARY, supra note 99, at 679).
182. Id. at 51 ("In our view, misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain access to
information that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that information is plainly
'deceptive' within the meaning of the word. It is unclear, however, that exploiting a
weakness in an electronic code to gain unauthorized access is 'deceptive,' rather than
being mere theft.").
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the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b)."183 It appears that the SEC is
therefore free from any obligation to fit the purported perpetration
into either of the currently available doctrines of insider trading'" and
can now truly focus on the presence of the fraud itself. This standard
will undoubtedly alter both the types of cases the SEC will pursue and
the manner in which the SEC proceeds with those cases.
The power of the Dorozhko approach stems from the fact that it
is not tethered to either the classical or misappropriation theories of
insider trading."' As the Second Circuit stated, "an affirmative
misrepresentation is a distinct species of fraud.""' Further, the court
categorized its newly adopted standard as a "straightforward theory
of fraud."'" Put into context, this means that the SEC can now pursue
cases of insider trading without needing to show either: (a) the
defendant remained silent while under a duty to disclose;'" or (b) the
defendant misappropriated material nonpublic information from a
source to whom he owed a duty.'"' The primary focus for the SEC is
now the presence of fraud and deception.
Examples from a few notable recent cases where the SEC settled
serve to illustrate how the SEC can implement the new standard to
target individuals who trade on fraudulently obtained nonpublic
information. In SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann,90 the SEC
brought suit against three individuals, alleging that they fraudulently
misrepresented themselves as a client to Business Wire, Inc. to obtain
material nonpublic information 9 ' and trade on the information.192

183. Id.
184. See supra Part I (discussing the misappropriation and classical theories).
185. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 45 ("[W]e recognize that the SEC's claim against
defendant-a corporate outsider who owed no fiduciary duties to the source of the
information-is not based on either of the two generally accepted theories of insider
trading.").
186. Id. at 49.
187. Id.
188. See supra Part I (explaining that the classical theory requires a defendant to fail to
disclose information when under a duty to disclose).
189. See supra Part I (explaining that the misappropriation theory is based on the
defendant's duty to a person from who he misappropriated the information).
190. No. 05 CV 9259 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007).
191. Complaint at 2-3, SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05 CV 9259
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
comp19450.pdf. Business Wire, Inc. operated a secure website in order to allow its clients
to submit news releases to be disseminated to the public. Id. at 2. The defendants
misrepresented themselves as a client to Business Wire in order to gain client access and
then launched a "spider" computer program which retrieved confidential new releases
before they were released to the public. Id. The defendants settled, disgorging the profits
and paying a civil penalty of $650,000. Litigation Release, SEC, Court Issues Final
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With the standard set forth in Dorozhko, the SEC would be able to
focus solely on proving that the defendants' actions fell under the
broad, ordinary meaning of "deceptive" rather than being forced to
settle because of the difficulties in proving that the individuals had
fiduciary duties. Perhaps pushing the theory even further is the case
of SEC v. Stummer.193 There, the defendant snuck into his brother-inlaw's bedroom office and gained access to confidential information
which he later traded on by correctly guessing his brother-in-law's
password on the office computer.194 Under the Second Circuit's
standard, the SEC could establish liability by proving that the
defendant affirmatively misrepresented himself as his brother-in-law
to obtain the material nonpublic information, thereby meeting section
10(b)'s deception requirement.
CONCLUSION

By holding that fiduciary duty is not a required element for all
violations of section 10(b), the Second Circuit has streamlined the
cause of action for the SEC, while at the same time remaining true to
the original spirit of the statute. Section 10(b) was meant to be
construed flexibly to achieve its antifraud purpose" and to serve as a
" 'catchall' provision"' 9 6-- two propositions seemingly at odds with
any holding that would attempt to narrow the interpretation of the
text from its ordinary meaning. Furthermore, the Second Circuit's
holding is both solidly grounded in a common law understanding of
fraud and supported by case law from both the Supreme Court and
lesser courts. But most importantly of all, the Second Circuit has
effectuated the goal of section 10(b) by giving the SEC free reign to
focus on the presence of fraud in the cases it pursues, regardless of
the presence of fiduciary duty. The result of the SEC's operation
under the Second Circuit's standard will likely be the pursuit of more
fraudulent activities, including those thought perhaps unreachable
before the Second Circuit clarified the fiduciary requirement-with
Judgment by Consent Against Defendants Oliver Peek and Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann
(May 31, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/2007/lr20l34.htm.
192. Complaint, supra note 191, at 4-12.
193. No. 08 CV 3671 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2008).
194. Complaint at 3-6, SEC v. Stummer, No. 08 CV 3671 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20529.pdf.
195. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (citing
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); see also Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) ("Section 10(b) must be read
flexibly, not technically and restrictively.").
196. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the corresponding logical consequence that more fraudulent
marketplace behavior will be punished. The Second Circuit's decision
in Dorozhko, therefore, achieves section 10(b)'s fundamental
purpose by allowing it to freely be what it was drafted to be: an
antifraudstatute.
SEAN F. DOYLE

